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ABSTRACT 
This paper tests the interrelationships among risk, competition, and efficiency in the 
Chinese banking industry between 2003 and 2013, with an efficiency-adjusted Lerner 
index and stability inefficiency as the indicators of competition and insolvency risk. The 
results show that Chinese commercial banks with higher efficiency have higher credit 
risk and insolvency risk, but lower liquidity risk and capital risk. Greater competition 
decreases credit risk and insolvency risk, but increases liquidity risk. Credit risk and 
insolvency risk are significantly and positively related to efficiency, while liquidity risk 
and capital risk are significantly and negatively related. Finally, lower liquidity risk 
decreases competition.   
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1.  Introduction 
China’s economic development has attracted great attention from the rest of the 
world. During the period 2003–2013, China had an annual GDP growth rate of over 
10.2%. The Chinese banking sector has undergone sustainable and healthy development 
through several rounds of banking reforms initiated by the government since 1978. The 
main purpose of these reforms has been to increase competition, enhance stability, and 
improve the performance of the Chinese banking sector; and indeed, competition has 
increased significantly. State-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) still dominate the 
industry. However, according to statistics from the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC, 2013), their share of total banking sector assets decreased between 
2003 and 2013, to a low point of 43.3%. On the other hand, joint-stock commercial 
banks (JSCBs) and city commercial banks (CCBs) kept growing; in 2013 they held 
17.8% and 10.03% of total banking sector assets, respectively. Figure 1 shows the assets 
of SOCBs, JSCBs, CCBs, and total banking institutions in China over the period 2003–
2013. 
<<Figure 1 about here>> 
Over the same period, the Chinese banking industry also reduced its credit risk 
undertaken. Ratios of loans in default during 2011–2013 were at 1%, lower than the 
figures for 2008–2010.1 The industry also reduced its capital risk. CBRC statistics show 
                                                          
1 There is a common skepticism, and many analysts have accused Chinese authorities of 
underreporting bank risk as a way to artificially support confidence. We cross-check the 
data reported by CBRC against data collected from Bankscope. The information from 
Bankscope is taken by Bureau Van Dijk from a combination of annual reports, 
information providers, and regulatory sources. More than 200 validation controls are 
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that, by the end of 2013, the average capital adequacy ratio of Chinese banks was 12.2%, 
up by 1.6% from the previous year. In addition, the liquidity ratio of Chinese 
commercial banks was 44% by the end of 2013. Although this ratio was lower than the 
figure for 2012, which was 45.8%, it was higher than those for 2010 and 2011, at 42.2% 
and 43.2%, respectively.  
Few studies investigate competitive conditions in the Chinese banking sector 
(Fu, 2009; Masood & Sergi, 2011; Park, 2013; Tan, 2014; Tan & Floros, 2013a; Yuan, 
2006). More importantly, although a few studies examine the effect of competition on 
banks’ risk taking (Fu et al., 2014; Schaeck & Cihak, 2014; Soedarmono et al., 2013), 
three studies use data from the Chinese banking industry (Tan, 2014; Tan & Floros, 
2013b, 2014). These papers mainly focus on credit risk or insolvency risk, and do not 
consider other types of risk such as capital risk and liquidity risk. The impact of 
competition on capital risk and liquidity risk has policy implications for Chinese 
banking regulators, but the current empirical literature does not provide a clear estimate 
of this impact for China. There are also few empirical studies examining the 
performance of Chinese commercial banks (Sun et al., 2013; Tan, 2014; Tan & Floros, 
2013b). To our knowledge, there is no empirical study examining the effect of 
competition and different types of risk on efficiency in the Chinese banking industry.   
We use a sample of Chinese commercial banks (SOCBs, JSCBs, and CCBs) to 
test the interrelationships among efficiency, risk, and competition. Our study controls 
for a number of variables that are thought to influence those factors: bank-specific 
                                                                                                                                                                          
applied to the data, which are checked entity by entity and reviewed regularly. The data 
in the current paper come not only from CBRC, but also from Bankscope and World 
Bank databases.  
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variables (size, profitability, and diversification); industry-specific variables (banking 
sector development and stock market development); and macroeconomic variables 
(inflation and annual GDP). Data come from three sources, the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC), Bankscope, and the World Bank database. We use 
nonparametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to measure efficiency; accounting 
ratios as well as a translog function to measure different types of risk; and the 
efficiency-adjusted Lerner index to measure competition. To test the interrelationships 
among efficiency, competition, and risk, we use the well-known statistical (econometric) 
Granger-causality test.  
This paper is the first to investigate technical efficiency and pure technical 
efficiency as well as scale efficiency, reflecting both inside and outside factors 
influencing bank performance. In other words, we investigate the source of 
inefficiencies (either from bank management of inputs and outputs or from scale of 
operation) and their interrelationships with different types of risk and competition 
(which have important policy implications). This is also the first paper to test 
competition in the Chinese banking industry using the more accurate efficiency-
adjusted Lerner index rather than the traditional Lerner index (Amidu & Wolfe, 2013), 
and to test the robustness of the reported results using alternative indicators of 
competition and risk as well as different econometric techniques.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the 
literature on the interrelationships among risk, efficiency, and competition in the 
banking industry, while section 3 describes the data, the institutional background, and 
the methods. Section 4 discusses the empirical results. A robustness check is provided 
in section 5, and section 6 summarizes and concludes the paper.  
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2. Literature review 
2.1. The impacts of competition and efficiency on risk in the banking industry 
The competition-fragility hypothesis argues that banks can withstand shocks and 
decrease risk taking because in a less competitive environment they can earn higher 
profits through monopoly rents. In a pioneer investigation of the relationship between 
competition and stability in the banking sector, Keeley (1990) found that monopoly 
rents are eroded by an increase in competition, and this led to an increase in bank 
failures in the United States in the 1980s. Higher competition increases the number of 
marginal loan applicants who receive financing, so the quality of the loan portfolio is 
more likely to deteriorate and bank fragility increases. The competition-stability view 
suggests that in a less competitive banking market, banks charge higher interest rates, 
which will increase the probability of default on loan repayments (Boyd & De Nicole, 
2005).  
There are two main hypotheses about the impact of efficiency on risk in the 
banking industry, the bad management hypothesis and the moral hazard hypothesis. The 
bad management hypothesis (Berger & DeYoung, 1997; Williams, 2004) states that 
lower efficiency raises costs because banks do not monitor credit adequately and do not 
control expenses efficiently. The result is increases in banks’ risk because of credit, 
operational, market, and reputational problems. The moral hazard hypothesis (Jeitschko 
& Jeung, 2005) suggests that managers of inefficient banks tend to take higher risks 
because of informational friction and agency problems. 
  
2.2. The impacts of risk and efficiency on competition in the banking industry 
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A few empirical studies have investigated the impact of risk on competition 
(market power) in the banking industry (Fernández de Guevara & Maudos, 2007; 
Kasman & Carvallo, 2014; Tan & Floros, 2014). Most papers focus on either credit risk 
or insolvency risk. The impact of efficiency on competition is mainly addressed in the 
efficient-structure hypothesis (Demsetz, 1973) that more efficient banks gain market 
share at the expense of less efficient banks, so concentration increases and competition 
declines.  
 
2.3. The impacts of competition and risk on efficiency in the banking industry 
The competition-inefficiency hypothesis suggests that competition reduces bank 
efficiency, for the following reasons. First, Boot and Schmeits (2005) argue that higher 
bank competition increases customers’ propensity to switch to other service providers, 
in turn amplifying information asymmetries and requiring banks to devote additional 
resources to screening and monitoring borrowers. Second, Chan and colleagues (1986) 
argue that in a competitive environment, where bank relationships have shorter duration, 
the reduction of relationship-building activities inhibits the reusability and value of 
information. In contrast, the competition-efficiency hypothesis maintains that higher 
competition induces banks to specialize in certain types of loans or particular groups of 
borrowers, and induces bank managers to adjust their lending technologies so as to 
lower the costs of processing and originating loans and to better monitor borrowers. 
This positive impact is the obverse of the “Quiet Life hypothesis,” which argues that 
managers with monopoly power enjoy a share of monopoly rents, so they are careless in 
expense management and efficiency declines. The bad luck hypothesis (Berger & 
DeYoung, 1997) states that an increase in problem loans is mainly attributable to 
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external events rather than managers’ skills or their appetite for risk, and that the higher 
risk increases costs and managerial efforts. Thus, an increase in risk precedes a decline 
in bank efficiency.  
 
2.4. The interrelationships among risk, competition, and efficiency in the banking 
industry 
There are very few empirical studies testing the interrelationships among risk, 
competition, and efficiency in the banking sector. Using a sample of investment banks 
in ten large developed countries over the period 2000–2008, Fiordelisi, Girardone, and 
Nemanja (2011) examine Granger causality among these variables and show that the 
competition-stability paradigm holds for the investment banking industry. They find 
that competition in investment banking worldwide is quite limited, and that although 
relatively low competitive pressures enhance banks’ stability, they also allow banks to 
undertake higher risks.   
Kasman and Carrallo (2014) apply a similar approach to a sample of 272 
commercial banks from 15 Latin American countries for the period 2001–2008. The 
results show that higher competition leads to greater financial stability,  that banks with 
higher stability enjoy higher market power, and that banks with higher market power 
have higher efficiency.  
 
3. Data description, institutional background, and research method 
3.1. Data description 
We use recent data from 100 Chinese commercial banks (5 SOCBs, 12 JSCBs, 
and 83 CCBs) for the period 2003–2013. The bank-specific data are collected from the 
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Bankscope database, while the industry-specific variables as well as macroeconomic 
variables are retrieved from CBRC and World Bank databases. Panel A of Table 1 
presents the summary statistics of the variables that are used for the whole sample, 
while panels B, C, and D present the summary statistics of all variables by ownership 
types.  
<<Table 1 about here>> 
Figures 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d report the risk conditions of Chinese banks over the 
period 2003–2013. Figure 2a shows that the credit risk of SOCBs is substantially higher 
than that of JSCBs and CCBs between 2003 and 2008. Although after 2008 the three 
types of banks differ little in credit risk, the credit risk of CCBs is higher than that of 
JSCBs between 2005 and 2010. Figure 2b shows that in general, the ratio of liquid 
assets to total assets for SOCBs is lower than that of JSCBs and CCBs; in other words, 
the SOCBs have the highest liquidity risk. However, liquidity is highest in CCBs from 
2005 to 2008 and in JSCBs after 2010. In general, the capital level of CCBs kept 
increasing for most of the years examined, with slight decreases in some years (Figure 
2c). The capital level of SOCBs and JSCBs increased in 2010 compared to the previous 
year. Figure 2d shows insolvency risk year by year, as measured by stability 
inefficiency. Risk conditions from 2003 to 2006 were highly volatile, but they became 
less so between 2007 and 2013.2  
                                                          
2 For the estimation of insolvency risk, we follow Tan (2016) by estimating stability 
inefficiency derived from a translog specification with Z-score as the dependent 
variable. Four outputs (total loans, total deposits, other earning assets, and noninterest 
income) and two input prices (price of funds and price of capital) are considered.  
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Figure 3  shows that SOCBs have the highest technical efficiency over the 
period examined, while JSCBs have the lowest. When we decompose technical 
efficiency into pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency, SOCBs still have the 
highest pure technical efficiency, while CCBs have the lowest. Scale efficiency is 
higher than pure technical efficiency, indicating that scale efficiency contributes more 
than pure technical efficiency to overall technical efficiency in the Chinese banking 
sector. The results also suggest that Chinese commercial banks are inefficient in the 
pure technical sense and misallocate inputs and outputs in banking operations.3  
The efficiency-adjusted Lerner index presented in Figure 4 suggests that city 
commercial banks have higher market power than joint-stock commercial banks and 
state-owned commercial banks over the period 2003–2008. In other words, competition 
is lowest among city commercial banks.4  
<<Figure 2 about here>> 
<<Figure 3 about here>> 
<<Figure 4 about here>> 
 
3.2. Institutional background 
China’s banking system has undergone several rounds of reforms, the purpose of 
which is to improve bank stability, increase competition, and improve the competitive 
power and performance of Chinese commercial banks. In order to enhance the stability 
                                                          
3 For the estimation of efficiency of Chinese commercial banks, please see Appendix A 
for more details.  
4 For the estimation of the efficiency-adjusted Lerner index, please see Appendix B for 
more details.  
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of the industry, in 2003 the government established the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC), which is mainly responsible for supervising commercial bank 
operations; formulating rules and regulations; authorizing the establishment, changes, 
termination, and business scope of banking institutions; and conducting on-site 
examination and off-site surveillance of bank operations (see Tan, 2016). In addition, 
the Chinese government significantly reduced the risk of Chinese commercial banks 
through writing off the loans in default of SOCBs by using four asset management 
companies. There were two waves of writeoffs, in 2004 and 2005.  
To increase competition, the Chinese government and the banking regulatory 
authority introduced foreign banks and gradually released the restrictions on their 
activities. From 2001, foreign banks were allowed to provide foreign currency services 
to Chinese and foreign enterprises and individuals all over the country.  At first they 
were allowed to offer local currency business to foreign enterprises and overseas 
individuals only in specific cities/areas in China, but this restriction was gradually 
released; also, foreign banks were allowed to provide local currency business to 
domestic Chinese enterprises as well as to Chinese individuals. By the end of 2006, 
foreign banks were treated exactly the same as domestic Chinese commercial banks, 
significantly improving competition in the industry.  
To increase the competitive power of Chinese commercial banks, the Chinese 
government injected capital into SOCBs and JSCBs. In 2003, 42.5 billion USD was 
injected into the Bank of China and the China Construction Bank; in 2004, 15 billion 
USD was injected into the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and 2.5 billion 
RMB  into the Bank of Communication. In 2005 and 2006, 30 billion RMB was 
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injected into the China Everbright bank, and finally, in 2008, the Agricultural Bank of 
China received 130 billion RMB.  
In order to improve their performance, Chinese commercial banks started 
courting foreign strategic investors. By the end of 2003, 5 Chinese commercial banks 
had attracted 7 foreign strategic investors. In 2004, HSBC purchased a 19.9% share 
from the Bank of Communication, the largest foreign bank purchase of domestic bank 
shares at that time, and only 0.1% below the maximum percentage of shareholding by 
foreign strategic investors allowed by the CBRC. In 2004 and 2005, the number of 
foreign strategic investors kept increasing, until there were nearly 20 of them in 14 
Chinese commercial banks. This number further increased to 33 foreign strategic 
investors in 25 domestic commercial banks by the end of 2007. By the end of 2011, the 
total number of foreign investors was 57 and the number of domestic commercial banks 
involved was 36.  
 
3.3. Research methods 
3.3.1. Measurement of competition in the Chinese banking industry—the efficiency-
adjusted Lerner index 
Recent empirical studies of bank competition use three main methods to measure 
competition: Panzar-Rosse H statistics (Jeon et al., 2011; Matthews et al., 2007; Olivero 
et al., 2011); the Boone indicator (Tabak et al., 2012; Tan, 2017), and the Lerner index 
(Cipollini & Fiordelisi, 2011; Fungacova et al., 2014; Tan, 2016). 
The Panzar-Rosse H statistic suffers from two drawbacks. First, Leuvensteijn  and 
colleagues (2011) argue that it is based on a static model and the value of the statistic 
ranges from -∞ to 1. In other words, this indicator suffers from a degree of uncertainty. 
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Second, market entry and exit make it impossible to fulfil the test requirement of market 
equilibrium. The Boone indicator also suffers from two limitations: it assumes that part 
of banks’ efficiency gains will be passed on to consumers (Tabak et al., 2012), and it, 
too, suffers from a degree of uncertainty derived from idiosyncratic variation. 
We prefer the Lerner index as a measure of bank competition, mainly  for two 
reasons. (1) It can be measured for each bank in each year, so it can be matched with 
other bank-specific variables and in particular with the key variables of the current 
study, efficiency and risk. (2) It can measure market power for all three types of 
Chinese commercial banks (SOCBs, JSCBs, and CCBs).  
Koetter and colleagues (2012) argue that the conventional Lerner index assumes 
both profit efficiency and cost efficiency, and the estimated profit-cost margin does not 
accurately reflect the true market power. Therefore we use the efficiency-adjusted 
Lerner index proposed by Clerides and colleagues (2015). In the efficiency-adjusted 
Lerner index, the marginal cost is estimated using a translog cost function with four 
outputs (total deposits, total loans, noninterest income, and other earning assets) and 
two input prices (price of funds and price of capital).  
3.3.2. Investigation of the interrelationships among competition, risk, and efficiency in 
the Chinese banking industry  
We use a Granger-causality test, an approach that has been widely applied to test 
interrelationships in banking studies (Casu & Girardone, 2009; Fiordelisi, Marques-
Ibanez, & Molyneux, 2011; Fiordelisi & Molyneux, 2010). The interrelationships 
among risk, competition, and efficiency in the Chinese banking industry can be 
estimated using the following equations: 
titilagilagilagilagilagiti XncompetitioSEffPTEffTEffRiskfRisk ,,,,,,,, ),,,,,(    (1) 
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titilagilagilagilagilagiti XncompetitioSEffPTEffTEffRiskfTEff ,,,,,,,, ),,,,,(    (2) 
titilagilagilagilagilagiti XncompetitioSEffPTEffTEffRiskfPTEff ,,,,,,,,, ),,,,(    (3) 
titilagilagilagilagilagiti XncompetitioSEffPTEffTEffRiskfSEff ,,,,,,,,, ),,,,(        (4) 
(5) 
The subscripts i and t represent a specific bank operating in a specific year, while Risk 
is the different types of risk considered in the current study: credit risk, liquidity risk, 
capital risk, and insolvency risk. We use relevant accounting ratios to measure the 
former three types of risk. Credit risk is measured by the ratio of nonperforming loans 
to total loans; a higher ratio indicates higher credit risk. Liquidity risk is measured by 
the ratio of liquid assets to total assets; here, a higher ratio indicates a lower liquidity 
risk. Capital risk is measured by the ratio of a bank’s capital to its risk-weighted assets; 
a higher ratio indicates lower capital risk. For insolvency risk, rather than the 
accounting ratio (the Z-score5), we use a translog specification to estimate stability 
                                                          
5 The Z-score reflects the extent to which banks can absorb losses. Thus, a higher Z-
score indicates lower risk and greater stability. Most empirical studies use the Z-score to 
measure the stability of financial institutions (Iannotta et al., 2007). The Z-score is 
calculated as follows: 
)(
/
ROA
AEROA
Z



  ,                                                       (6)                                                                  
 
where ROA is banks’ return on assets, E/A is the ratio of equity to total assets, 
and )(ROA is the standard deviation of return on assets. 
.),,,,( ,,,,,,,,, titilagilagilagilagilagiti XncompeittioSEffPTEffTEffRiskfnCompetitio 
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inefficiency (Tan, 2016) which is supposed to provide more robust results. TEff, PTEff, 
and SEff represent technical efficiency, pure technical efficiency, and scale efficiency, 
respectively. We measure efficiency by using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), 
following Chortareas and colleagues (2016); and rather than focusing on cost efficiency, 
we evaluate pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency. This estimation should help 
the Chinese government and banking regulatory authorities to find the source of 
inefficiency and make relevant policies to improve performance.  
 This is the first study applying the efficiency-adjusted Lerner index to measure 
competition and testing its interrelationships with risk and efficiency. The efficiency-
adjusted Lerner index yields more robust results than the traditional Lerner index used 
by Fiordelisi, Girardone, and Nemanja (2011). In equations 1–5, X represents a number 
of control variables influencing the interrelationships among risk, efficiency, and 
competition: bank size, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets; diversification, 
measured by the ratio of noninterest income to gross revenue; bank profitability (ROA); 
banking sector development, measured by the ratio of banking sector assets to GDP; 
stock market development, measured by the ratio of market capitalization of listed 
companies to GDP; inflation; and GDP growth rate. Two ownership types are 
considered, joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) and city commercial banks (CCBs). 
  is the error term.6  
Given the frequency of our annual data, we follow the study of Fiordelisi, 
Marques-Ibanez, and Molyneux (2011) with regard to the choice of lag length. The 
                                                          
6 Appendix C summarizes the variables used in the current study, while appendix D 
shows the total assets of categories of banking institutions in China in 2013 other than 
SOCBs, JSCBs, and CCBs.   
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AR(2) process is estimated for the interrelationships among risk, efficiency, and 
competition. Granger causality is assessed as the joint test of the null hypothesis that the 
two lags are equal to zero. With the AR(2) process, we analyse Granger causality as the 
joint test that the two lags of each of the determinants is distributed as a chi-square with 
two degrees of freedom. The null hypothesis, that two lags are equal to zero, will be 
rejected if the probability value is less than 10%. In other words, if the probability value 
is less than 0.1, at the 10% significance level, it can be concluded that x does have an 
impact on y. In estimating the above equations, we follow Fiordelisi, Marques-Ibanez, 
and Molyneux (2011) by calculating a two-step Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) system estimator with Windmeijer’s (2005) corrected standard error. 
 
4. Empirical results 
In column 1 of Tables 2 and 5, the positive and significant coefficients of 
technical efficiency (Total), pure technical efficiency (Total), and scale efficiency (Total) 
show that efficiency is positively and significantly related to the credit risk and 
insolvency risk of Chinese commercial banks. The effect on credit risk, which 
contradicts the bad management and moral hazard hypotheses, can be interpreted as 
indicating that, in order to generate a higher volume of outputs, Chinese commercial 
banks put less effort into monitoring and credit-checking loans. This omission increases 
the volume of loans in default and thus credit risk. The effect on insolvency risk can be 
interpreted as indicating that Chinese commercial banks with greater efficiency engage 
in diversified portfolios of business; also, the large demand for funds reduces solvency 
and increases insolvency risk.  
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In Column 1 of Tables 3 and 4, the positive and significant coefficients of 
technical efficiency (Total), pure technical efficiency (Total), and scale efficiency (Total) 
show that higher efficiency leads to higher ratio of liquid assets to total assets (lower 
liquidity risk) and higher ratio of a bank’s capital to its risk-weighted assets (lower 
capital risk). In other words, efficiency is significantly and negatively related to 
liquidity risk and capital risk. The effect on liquidity risk, which is in line with the bad 
management hypothesis, can be interpreted as indicating that Chinese commercial banks 
with higher levels of efficiency have higher ability to generate higher volumes of 
outputs using a certain amount of inputs, or minimize the input investment to produce 
certain levels of outputs, thus reducing the bank’s cost and improving its profitability. In 
turn, higher profitability allows banks to retain higher volumes of capital, so they have 
lower capital risk.  
The efficiency-adjusted Lerner index is positively and significantly related to 
credit risk and insolvency risk, in line with the competition-stability hypothesis, while it 
is negatively related to liquidity risk, in accordance with the competition-fragility 
hypothesis (see column 1 of Tables 2, 3, and 5).  
Further, we find that credit risk and insolvency risk are positively and 
significantly related to efficiency. The effect of credit risk (see columns 3 and 4 of 
Table 2), which contradicts the bad luck hypothesis, can be interpreted as indicating that 
higher volumes of loans in default drive bank managers to put more effort into 
allocating resources and thereby improve efficiency. The effect of insolvency risk (see 
columns 2–4 in Table 5) can be interpreted as indicating that Chinese commercial banks 
use all available funds to engage in different types of business (traditional loan and 
deposit business as well as other noninterest income-generating business), so it is 
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difficult for the banks to meet their obligations when they become due. However, the 
large volumes and large variety of business also generate economies of scale as well as 
economies of scope that improve efficiency.  
The results further show that liquidity risk and capital risk have negative and 
significant impacts on the efficiency of Chinese commercial banks. The positive and 
significant coefficients for liquidity risk (see columns 2 and 3 in Table 3) may indicate 
that banks with higher liquidity have stronger ability to deal with sudden withdrawals 
by depositors, to some extent reflecting good management. Higher managerial ability 
improves the allocation of inputs and outputs, and thereby improves efficiency. The 
negative and significant impact of capital risk on efficiency (see columns 2–4 in Table 4) 
is in line with the findings of Fiordelisi, Marques-Ibanez, and Molyneux (2011) for a 
sample of European banks. This result can be interpreted as indicating that banks with 
more capital (lower capital risk) have lower funding costs, as higher capital is an 
important signal of creditworthiness (Molyneux, 1993). In turn, lower funding cost 
reduces input investment and improves efficiency.   
Finally, column 5 in Table 3 shows that lower liquidity risk results in a less 
competitive environment (higher market power). Banks with lower liquidity risk have 
lower borrowing costs, and the resulting improvement in price and cost margin 
increases market power.  
<<Table 2 about here> 
<<Table 3 about here>> 
<<Table 4 about here>> 
<<Table 5 about here>> 
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5. Robustness check 
We tested the robustness of our empirical results in a number of ways. First, we 
used alternative econometric techniques: the three-stage least square estimator (3-SLS) 
as well as the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR). Second, we used the Lerner index, 
rather than the efficiency-adjusted Lerner index. Finally, we used the Z-score as an 
alternative indicator of insolvency risk. All these tests confirm that our main results 
hold.7 
 
6. Summary and concluding remarks 
For our sample of Chinese commercial banks over the period 2003–2013, higher 
efficiency leads to higher credit risk and insolvency risk, but lower liquidity risk and 
capital risk. Chinese commercial banks undertake higher credit risk and insolvency risk, 
and lower liquidity risk, in a less competitive environment. Credit risk and insolvency 
risk seem to increase bank efficiency, while liquidity risk and capital risk significantly 
decrease it. Finally, lower liquidity risk increases market power (decreases competition) 
for Chinese commercial banks. We strongly believe that our study not only provides a 
comprehensive picture of the risk conditions of Chinese commercial banks, but also 
sheds light on the interrelationships among risk, efficiency, and competition in general, 
and provides insights relevant to banking research in other countries.  
Our findings have important policy implications. First, the Chinese government 
and regulatory authorities should increase the levels of capital held by Chinese 
commercial banks; the capital injections already made have been very effective in 
                                                          
7 The results of the robustness check are not reported in this paper to save space; they 
are available from the authors upon request.  
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reducing capital risk and improving efficiency. Second, the government should continue 
its effort to increase competition, as greater competition reduces the volume of loans in 
default. Finally, both commercial banks and regulatory authorities should carefully 
consider liquidity levels to balance increased competition with decreased efficiency.  
 
Appendix A 
Efficiency estimation of bank efficiency using data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
The efficiency estimates in this study are obtained using DEA, following Sufian 
(2010). Both DEA CCR and DEA BCC models are used to derive the technical, pure 
technical, and scale efficiencies of Chinese commercial banks. The CCR model can be 
expressed as follows: 
0,0,0,min ,   XXYysubjectto ii  ,                                      (A.1)                                                                                
where   is a scalar and   is a N×1 vector of constants, Y represents all input and 
output data for N firms, ix are individual inputs, and iy  
is the outputs for the i th firm. 
The efficiency score for each DMU is given by  ; it takes a value between 0 and 1, 
which indicates the efficiency level. 
The CRS linear programming problem can be easily modified to account for 
VRS by adding the convexity constraint, N1’λ=1, to produce 
0,1'1,0,0,min ,   NXXYysubjectto ii  ,                   (A.2) 
where N1 is an N×1 vector of ones. This approach forms a convex hull of intersecting 
plans that envelop the data points more tightly than the CRS conical hull; this provides 
pure technical efficiency scores which are greater than or equal to those obtained using 
the CRS model. If the efficiency scores obtained from the CRS model and the VRS 
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model are different, this indicates that the DMU has scale inefficiency, and that the 
scale inefficiency can be calculated from the difference between the VRS technical 
efficiency (TE) score and the CRS TE score. The relationship between CRS and VRS is 
given below:
 
SETETE VRSCRS   .                                                               (A.3)                                                                                                                                                                          
The main argument for preferring DEA to parametric techniques, such as SFA, 
lies in the fact that it works particularly well with small samples. Furthermore, it is able 
to handle multiple inputs and outputs stated in different measurement units, and it does 
not necessitate knowledge of any functional form of the frontier (Charnes et al., 1995). 
Most empirical papers show that using DEA to estimate the efficient frontier can yield 
robust results (Seiford & Thrall, 1990). We use two inputs, the price of deposit 
(measured by the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits), and the price of capital 
(measured by the ratio of noninterest expenses to fixed assets). Two input prices are 
considered because noninterest expenses include labor cost as well (Hasan & Morton, 
2003). In other words, the price of capital considers factors relating to the price of 
human capital as well as the price of physical capital . Four outputs are selected in the 
current study: total loans, securities, noninterest income, and total deposits.  
 
Appendix B 
Estimation of competition in the banking industry: the efficiency-adjusted Lerner 
index                          
We follow Clerides and colleagues (2015) with regard to the estimation of the 
efficiency-adjusted Lerner index, which can be expressed as follows: 
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where i and t represent a specific bank operating in a specific year;  represents bank 
profit, measured by net income; tc represents total cost, calculated as the sum of interest 
expenses as well as noninterest expenses; and q stands for earning assets. We use total 
loans and total securities as the measurement of earning assets. mc stands for marginal 
cost, which is calculated by using a translog cost function as follows:  
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where C represents the bank’s total cost; Y represents total deposits, total loans, 
noninterest income, and other earning assets; and W stands for two input prices, with 
W1 representing the price of funds, measured by the ratio of interest expenses to total 
deposits, and W2 representing the price of capital, measured by the ratio of noninterest 
expenses to fixed assets. Two input prices are considered, since noninterest expenses 
includes labor cost (Hasan & Morton, 2003). In other words, the price of capital 
considers the price of human capital as well as the price of physical capital. Linear 
homogeneity is ensured by normalizing the dependent variable and W1 by another input 
price W2.   
The marginal cost of loans can be obtained by taking the first derivative of the 
dependent variable in the above equation in relationship to the output loans, as follows: 
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Appendix C 
Variable descriptions 
Variable  Symbol Description  
Risk Credit risk 
Liquidity risk 
Capital risk 
Insolvency risk 
Ratio of loans in default to 
total loans 
Ratio of liquid assets to total 
assets 
Ratio of a bank’s capital to 
its risk-weighted assets 
Estimate from stochastic 
frontier 
Efficiency TEff 
PTEff 
SEff 
Estimate from data 
envelopment analysis 
Competition Efficiency-adjusted Lerner 
index 
See Appendix B 
Bank size LTA Natural logarithm of total 
assets 
Bank diversification NNIGR Ratio of noninterest income to 
gross revenue 
Bank profitability ROA Ratio of net income to total 
assets 
Banking sector development BSD Ratio of banking sector assets 
to GDP 
Stock market development SMD Ratio of market capitalization 
of listed companies to GDP 
Inflation INF Annual inflation rate 
GDP growth rate GDPG Annual GDP growth rate 
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Appendix D 
Total assets of categories of banking institutions in China in 2013 other than SOCBs, 
JSCBs, and CCBs 
 
Institution Total assets 
Policy banks and the China Development 
Bank 
125278 
Rural commercial banks 85218 
Rural cooperative banks 12322 
Rural credit cooperatives 85951 
Nonbank financial institutions 39681 
Foreign banks 25628 
New-type rural financial institutions and 
the postal savings bank 
62110 
Notes: figures in RMB100 million. 
Data source: 2013 Annual report of the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC).
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Fig. 1. Summary of the assets of SOCBs, JSCBs, CCBs and total banking institutions in China over the period 2003–2013. 
Source: Annual reports of CBRC (China Banking Regulatory Commission); figures in RMB 100 million.   
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Fig. 2a. Credit risk in the Chinese banking industry.                                                                        Fig. 2b. Liquidity risk in the  Chinese banking industry.  
                                                                                                                                 
                                             
Fig. 2a. Capital risk in the Chinese banking industry.                                                                         Fig. 2b. Insolvency risk (stability inefficiency) in the Chinese         
                  Banking industry. 
Fig. 2. Risk conditions in the Chinese banking industry (2003–2013). 
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Fig. 3. Efficiency in the Chinese banking industry. 
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Fig. 4. Competitive conditions in the Chinese banking industry as measured by efficiency-adjusted Lerner index. 
 
 
33 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of the variables. 
 
 Panel A: all banks Panel B: SOCBs Panel C: JSCBs Panel D: CCBs 
 Obs Mean SD Median Obs Mean SD Median Obs Mean SD Median Obs Mean SD Median 
Credit risk 632 2.78 4.48 2.17 56 5.8 8.16 5.5 96 2.37 3.96 2.33 480 2.51 3.8 2.42 
Liquidity risk 777 0.27 0.12 0.21 56 0.21 0.052 0.19 110 0.278 0.105 0.25 611 0.27 0.12 0.25 
Capital risk 637 11.9 4.7 10.38 50 11.83 2.02 11.77 101 11.24 6.09 11.18 486 12.06 4.56 11.19 
Insolvency risk 1100 0.33 0.21 0.31 55 0.331 0.212 0.32 132 0.331 0.21 0.31 913 0.331 0.21 0.28 
Technical efficiency 751 0.92 0.059 0.88 55 0.97 0.035 0.81 132 0.913 0.05 0.89 564 0.92 0.06 0.77 
Pure technical 
efficiency 
759 0.93 0.055 0.9 55 0.975 0.033 0.93 133 0.928 0.05 0.91 571 0.926 0.06 0.83 
Scale efficiency 759 0.976 0.102 0.95 55 0.995 0.006 0.98 133 0.977 0.087 0.95 571 0.974 0.11 0.96 
Efficiency-adjusted 
Lerner index  
800 0.53 0.13 0.48 56 0.487 0.09 0.45 129 0.495 0.1 0.45 615 0.54 0.13 0.49 
Size 843 4.9 0.99 4.5 56 6.77 0.32 6.55 136 5.76 0.55 5.58 651 4.56 0.798 4.49 
Bank diversification 828 13.98 13.31 13.88 56 17.5 7.82 16.9 134 12.13 7.87 12.08 638 14.06 14.5 13.88 
ROA 808 0.008
8 
0.006
6 
0.006 55 0.009 0.004 0.007 127 0.006 0.006 0.005 598 0.01 0.007 0.008 
Banking sector 
development 
1100 2.22 0.24 0.21             
Stock market 
development 
1027 71.2 43.39 69.2             
Inflation  1128 2.85 1.93 2.55             
GDP growth  1100 10.19 1.87 10.03             
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Table 2 
Relationship among credit risk, efficiency, and competition in the Chinese banking industry. 
 Model 1: y=credit risk  
(Column 1) 
Model 2: y=technical 
efficiency (Column 2) 
Model 3: y=pure technical 
efficiency (Column 3) 
Model 4: y=scale efficiency  
(Column 4) 
Model 5: y=efficiency-
adjusted Lerner index 
(Column 5) 
Intercept 129.87(1.62) 119.14*(1.66) 69.77**(1.98) 4.29**(2.07) 24.21(1.50) 
Credit Risk (t-1) 0.25***(5.11) 0.001(0.35) 0.001(0.55) 0.001***(3.07) -0.001(-1.19) 
Credit risk (t-2) 0.09***(2.91) 0.001(0.88) 0.001(1.55) 0.0001(0.08) -0.0004(-0.73) 
Credit risk (total) 91.25*** 2.24 5.26* 15.48*** 2.61 
Technical efficiency(t-1) -281.37***(-4.23) 138.74*(1.81) 81.13**(2.18) 6.74***(3.19) 28.11(1.53) 
Technical efficiency (t-2) 447.51***(4.22) -6.47(-0.46) -3.68(-0.49) -2.9***(-3.42) -1.71(-0.25) 
Technical efficiency (total) 23.02*** 3.74 5.58* 21.97*** 2.38 
Pure technical efficiency (t-1) 268.32***(4.10) -137.6*(-1.81) -80.53**(-2.18) -6.83***(-3.27) -27.72(-1.53) 
Pure technical efficiency (t-2) -438.9***(-4.14) 6.66(0.48) 3.76(0.51) 2.9***(3.44) 1.8(0.26) 
Pure technical efficiency 
(total) 
21.83*** 3.72 5.54* 22.50*** 2.37 
Scale efficiency (t-1) 273.97***(4.29) -126.09*(-1.80) -73.63**(-2.17) -5.88***(-3.05) -26.34(-1.55) 
Scale efficiency(t-2) -401.15***(4.18) 5.95(0.47) 3.4(0.50) 2.46***(3.21) 1.89(0.30) 
Scale efficiency (total) 22.99*** 3.72 5.54* 20.14*** 2.42 
Efficiency-adjusted Lerner 
index (t-1) 
-1.76**(-2.31) -0.02(-0.21) -0.02(-0.35) 0.03***(3.19) 0.27***(3.64) 
Efficiency-adjusted Lerner -1.83*(1.90) -0.04(-0.46) -0.01(-0.18) -0.02**(-2.00) 0.11***(3.29) 
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index (t-2) 
Efficiency-adjusted Lerner 
index (total) 
5.56** 0.52 0.28 11.48*** 20.52*** 
Bank size 0.16***(2.52) 0.02***(3.04) 0.02***(5.10) 0.005***(3.72) -0.01*(-1.71) 
Diversification -0.01**(-2.31) 0.0004(0.72) 0.0004(1.01) 0.0002***(3.52) -0.0002(-0.48) 
ROA -15.27***(-3.12) 0.72(1.44) 0.45(1.19) 0.03(0.35) 5.76***(11.75) 
Banking sector development -0.25(-0.49) 0.24***(4.12) 0.25***(6.86) 0.05***(5.13) 0.06(1.56) 
Stock market development -0.006***(-2.79) 0.0002(0.85) -9.18e-06(-0.07) -0.0001**(-2.21) 0.0004**(2.25) 
Inflation -0.03*(-1.75) 0.012***(3.91) 0.01***(5.61) 0.001***(3.58) 0.005***(3.45) 
GDP growth rate 0.33***(5.06) -0.001(-0.09) 0.006(1.39) 0.005***(3.88) -0.004(-0.80) 
JSCBs -0.38***(-9.00) -0.05***(-3.12) -0.22***(-4.18) -0.02***(-3.57) 0.05(0.80) 
CCBs 0.74***(-11.91) -0.06***(-3.55) -0.38***(-4.32) -0.03***(-3.92) 0.12***(6.19) 
Observations 285 295 296 296 297 
Hansen test 0.644 0.768 0.366 0.395 0.369 
AR(1) 0.034 0.088 0.025 0.001 0.006 
AR(2) 0.938 0.611 0.915 0.809 0.213 
Notes: We use a two-step system GMM estimator. 
The symbols *, **, ***, represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
The variables credit risk (total), technical efficiency (total), pure technical efficiency (total), efficiency-adjusted Lerner (total) are the estimated coefficients for the test 
that the sum of the lagged terms is equal to zero. A significance level lower than 10% enables us to reject the null hypothesis that x does not have an impact on y. A 
significant and positive sign indicates that the impact is positive, while a significant and negative sign indicates a negative impact. The null hypothesis of the Hansen 
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test is that instruments used are not correlated with residuals, and so the overidentifying restrictions are valid. In AR (Arellano-Bond) tests for serial correlation in the 
first-differenced residuals, the null hypothesis is that errors in the first difference regression do not exhibit first/second order serial correlation. 
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Table 3 
Relationship among liquidity risk, efficiency, and competition in the Chinese banking industry. 
 Model 1: y=liquidity risk 
(Column 1) 
Model 2: y=technical 
efficiency (Column 2) 
Model 3: y=pure technical 
efficiency (Column 3) 
Model 4: y=scale efficiency 
(Column 4) 
Model 5: y=efficiency-
adjusted Lerner index 
(Column 5) 
Intercept -8.27**(-2.22) 71.07*(1.93) -13.56***(-4.50) 18.41***(11.62) 9.81(1.33) 
Liquidity Risk (t-1) 0.3**(2.35) -0.23***(-2.63) -0.16***(-7.87) 0.007(0.55) -0.06*(-1.67) 
Liquidity risk (t-2) 0.2**(6.08) 0.02(0.19) 0.04**(1.96) 0.02(1.09) 0.07***(2.61) 
Liquidity risk (total) 45.28*** 10.09*** 61.98*** 1.56 7.18** 
Technical efficiency(t-1) -4.38(-0.92) 102.37**(2.05) 13.58***(3.16) 13.12***(10.48) 9.45(1.05) 
Technical efficiency (t-2) -3.93(-1.25) -25.66(-1.63) -28.7***(-8.48) 5.74***(3.82) 0.89(0.18) 
Technical efficiency (total) 5.41* 4.23 82.33*** 153.93*** 1.83 
Pure technical efficiency (t-1) 4.24(0.91) -100.94**(-2.05) -13.38***(3.15) -13.17***(-10.70) -9.25(-1.04) 
Pure technical efficiency (t-2) 3.81(1.23) 25.47(1.62) 28.26***(8.39) -5.61***(-3.79) -0.87(-0.18) 
Pure technical efficiency 
(total) 
5.22* 4.22 80.53*** 158.57*** 1.85 
Scale efficiency (t-1) 4.52(0.98) -94.34**(-2.04) -12.23***(-3.09) -12.17***(-10.29) -9.24(-1.09) 
Scale efficiency(t-2) 3.44(1.14) 22.75(1.60) 26.2***(8.49) -5.57***(-4.06) -0.69(-0.15) 
Scale efficiency (total) 5.31* 4.21 82.42*** 146.5*** 1.77 
Efficiency-adjusted Lerner 
index (t-1) 
0.24***(4.74) 0.04(0.92) 0.06***(3.22) 0.004(0.48) 0.44***(13.59) 
Efficiency-adjusted Lerner -0.06(-1.40) -0.06(-0.76) 0.03(1.52) -0.02(-1.36) 0.1***(4.55) 
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index (t-2) 
Efficiency-adjusted Lerner 
index (total) 
25.49*** 1.15 13.50*** 2.06 321.54*** 
Bank size 0.003(0.94) 0.011(1.61) 0.02***(6.95) 0.008***(5.56) -0.0002(-0.07) 
Diversification -0.00003(-0.10) 0.002***(3.08) 0.001***(5.30) 0.001***(4.83) -0.00004(-0.17) 
ROA -0.6**(-2.00) 0.6(1.01) 0.23***(2.92) -0.025(-0.31) 5.12***(10.02) 
Banking sector development 0.21***(5.30) 0.14**(2.12) 0.23***(14.54) 0.045***(5.41) 0.04(1.59) 
Stock market development -0.0002*(-1.66) 0.0004(1.05) -0.00005(-0.79) -0.0002***(-5.13) 0.0004***(2.82) 
Inflation 0.01***(5.50) 0.01***(3.73) 0.008***(11.19) 0.003***(8.37) 0.005***(5.02) 
GDP growth rate 0.012***(3.17) -0.01(-0.87) 0.007***(3.91) 0.008***(6.33) -0.003(-0.83) 
JSCBs 0.61***(4.18) -0.06***(-3.52) -0.18***(-3.29) -0.09***(-5.11) 0.07(0.76) 
CCBs 1.26***(4.94) -0.08***(-3.95) -0.22***(-3.55) -0.12***(-6.280 0.22***(5.11) 
Observations 371 359 361 361 362 
Hansen test 0.405 0.357 0.274 0.218 0.631 
AR(1) 0.011 0.056 0.000 0.110 0.001 
AR(2) 0.656 0.438 0.241 0.759 0.300 
Notes: We use a two-step system GMM estimator. 
The symbols *, **, ***, represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The variables liquidity risk (total), technical efficiency (total), pure technical 
efficiency (total), and efficiency-adjusted Lerner index (total) are the estimated coefficients for the test that the sum of the lagged terms is equal to zero. A significance 
level lower than 10% enables us to reject the null hypothesis that x does not have an impact on y. A significant and positive sign indicates that the impact is positive, 
while a significant and negative sign indicates a negative impact. The null hypothesis of the Hansen test is that instruments used are not correlated with residuals, and 
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so the overidentifying restrictions are valid. In AR (Arellano-Bond) tests for serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, the null hypothesis is that errors in the 
first difference regression do not exhibit first/second order serial correlation. 
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Table 4 
Relationship among capital risk, efficiency, and competition in the Chinese banking industry. 
 Model 1: y=capital risk 
(Column 1) 
Model 2: y=technical 
efficiency (Column 2) 
Model 3: y=pure technical 
efficiency (Column 3) 
Model 4: y=scale efficiency  
(Column 4) 
Model 5: y=efficiency-
adjusted Lerner index 
(Column 5) 
Intercept -172.72(-0.98) -37.16***(-7.38) -38.35***(-6.52) -2.1(-0.56) 14.19(1.18) 
Capital Risk (t-1) 0.47***(9.41) 0.002***(2.84) 0.002**(2.58) 0.001**(2.56) 0.0004(0.37) 
Capital  risk (t-2) -0.06*(-1.91) 0.002***(3.55) 0.001**(2.44) 0.001***(2.81) -0.002(-1.54) 
Capital  risk (total) 89.54*** 19.86*** 17.41*** 19.51*** 2.38 
Technical efficiency(t-1) 274.81*(1.71) 2.55(0.67) -2.23(-0.35) 1.68(0.90) 23.11*(1.67) 
Technical efficiency (t-2) -469.24***(-3.95) -44.25***(-12.33) -41.07***(-8.75) -5.05*(-1.68) -8.7(-1.51) 
Technical efficiency (total) 17.37*** 157.29*** 89.01*** 6.05** 3.80 
Pure technical efficiency (t-1) -273.25*(-1.72) -2.27(-0.60) 2.23(0.35) -1.82(-0.98) -22.55*(-1.65) 
Pure technical efficiency (t-2) 473.29***(4.00) 43.56***(12.23) 40.53***(8.69) 4.999*(1.68) 8.62(1.51) 
Pure technical efficiency 
(total) 
17.66*** 154.55*** 88.31*** 6.40** 3.75 
Scale efficiency (t-1) -241.08(-1.60) -1.97(-0.56) 2.12(0.36) -1.35(-0.81) -22.51*(-1.76) 
Scale efficiency(t-2) 415.03***(3.85) 39.75***(12.57) 36.85***(8.75) 4.4(1.62) 8.12(1.54) 
Scale efficiency (total) 16.46*** 164.6*** 88.74*** 5.57* 4.16 
Efficiency-adjusted Lerner 
index (t-1) 
2.38*(1.75) -0.03(-1.17) -0.01(-0.42) 0.02*(1.75) 0.42***(5.28) 
Efficiency-adjusted Lerner 0.14(0.10) -0.03(-1.11) -0.008(-0.51) -0.02(-1.50) 0.096***(2.64) 
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index (t-2) 
Efficiency-adjusted Lerner 
index (total) 
3.09 5.46* 0.94 4.94* 47.51*** 
Bank size -0.22**(-2.34) 0.02***(7.43) 0.02***(6.35) 0.005***(2.82) -0.009*(-1.85) 
Diversification -0.02*(-1.86) 0.001***(6.20) 0.001***(6.12) 0.0003***(3.62) 0.0001(0.24) 
ROA 1.69(0.10) -0.22*(-1.70) 0.05(0.39) -0.21**(-2.37) 6.13***(20.51) 
Banking sector development 0.59(0.67) 0.21***(13.41) 0.24***(12.15) 0.05***(5.42) 0.02(0.73) 
Stock market development 0.0004(0.10) 0.0001(1.60) -0.0001(-1.53) -0.0001***(-2.66) 0.0005***(3.82) 
Inflation 0.11**(2.32) 0.008***(16.80) 0.008***(11.35) 0.001***(2.69) 0.004***(3.55) 
GDP growth rate -0.07(-0.59) 0.005***(2.93) 0.01***(4.67) 0.006***(4.96) -0.01*(-1.85) 
JSCBs 0.004(0.12) -0.05***(-4.14) -0.15***(-4.17) -0.04***(-3.79) 0.12(0.03) 
CCBs 0.41***(5.88) -0.07***(-3.98) -0.38***(-4.22) -0.06***(-4.11) 0.02***(3.18) 
Observations 269 287 288 288 290 
Hansen test 0.245 0.145 0.174 0.175 0.631 
AR(1) 0.003 0.006 0.011 0.000 0.022 
AR(2) 0.327 0.993 0.824 0.510 0.443 
Notes: We use a two-step system GMM estimator. 
The symbols *, **, ***, represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The variables capital risk (total), technical efficiency (total), pure technical 
efficiency (total), and efficiency-adjusted Lerner index (total) are the estimated coefficients for the test that the sum of the lagged terms is equal to zero. A significance 
level lower than 10% enables us to reject the null hypothesis that x does not have an impact on y. A significant and positive sign indicates that the impact is positive, 
while a significant and negative sign indicates a negative impact. The null hypothesis of the Hansen test is that instruments used are not correlated with residuals, and 
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so the overidentifying restrictions are valid. In AR (Arellano-Bond) tests for serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, the null hypothesis is that errors in the 
first difference regression do not exhibit first/second order serial correlation. 
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Table 5 
Relationship among insolvency risk, efficiency, and competition in the Chinese banking industry. 
 Model 1: y=insolvency risk 
(Column 1) 
Model 2: y=technical 
efficiency (Column 2) 
Model 3: y=pure technical 
efficiency (Column 3) 
Model 4: y=scale efficiency 
(Column 4) 
Model 5: y=efficiency-
adjusted Lerner index 
(Column 5) 
Intercept 5.74(0.35) 29.93(0.57) -41.53**(-2.47) 1.2(0.49) -1.35(-0.58) 
Insolvency Risk (t-1) -0.67***(-23.89) 0.03**(2.09) 0.04***(3.38) 0.01***(2.96) -0.01(-1.09) 
Insolvency risk (total) 570.91*** 4.36** 11.43*** 8.76*** 1.20 
Technical efficiency(t-1) -23.87(-1.31) 54.75*(1.83) 3.7(0.53) -0.82(-0.38) -2.79(-0.83) 
Technical efficiency (t-2) 32.1**(2.55) -22.62(-0.70) -48.71***(-3.15) 1.58(0.81) 1.47(0.43) 
Technical efficiency (total) 6.66**** 9.14** 11.77*** 0.69 0.76 
Pure technical efficiency (t-1) 22.6(1.25) -54.02*(-1.83) -3.71(-0.54) 0.66(0.32) 2.69(0.81) 
Pure technical efficiency (t-2) -30.83**(-2.47) 22.29(0.69) 47.94***(3.13) -1.56(-0.82) -1.44(-0.43) 
Pure technical efficiency 
(total) 
6.22** 9.07** 11.63*** 0.68 0.73 
Scale efficiency (t-1) 21.97(1.29) -49.97*(-1.79) -2.61(-0.40) 1.32(0.64) 2.43(0.76) 
Scale efficiency(t-2) -26.45**(-2.31) 20.1(0.67) 44.94***(3.22) -1.55(-0.81) -1.06(-0.33) 
Scale efficiency (total) 5.58* 9.11** 12.20*** 0.88 0.70 
Efficiency-adjusted Lerner 
index (t-1) 
-0.23(-1.31) -0.003(-0.07) 0.002(0.07) 0.02*(1.80) 0.5***(15.46) 
Efficiency-adjusted Lerner 
index (t-2) 
0.54***(3.75) -0.09*(-1.80) -0.03(-0.82) -0.006(-0.46) 0.08***(2.84) 
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Efficiency-adjusted Lerner 
index (total) 
14.17*** 3.80 0.76 3.27 355.98*** 
Bank size -0.05***(-2.59) 0.014***(3.49) 0.02***(3.53) 0.003**(2.40) 0.001(0.39) 
Diversification 0.002*(1.94) 0.001***(3.35) 0.001**(2.26) 0.0004***(2.91) -0.0001(-0.50) 
ROA -39.23***(-2.86) 0.44(1.38) 0.48***(2.90) 0.008(0.08) 4.33***(7.16) 
Banking sector development -0.07(-1.01) 0.18**(2.15) 0.29***(9.34) 0.03**(2.28) 0.08***(3.77) 
Stock market development -0.002***(-5.87) 0.0002(1.01) -7.92E-06(-0.08) -0.0001**(-2.22) 0.0002***(2.89) 
Inflation -0.01(-1.56) 0.01***(3.65) 0.011***(8.07) 0.003***(3.66) 0.005***(5.11) 
GDP growth rate 0.007(0.75) -0.003(-0.49) 0.007***(2.63) 0.004**(2.48) 0.003(0.98) 
JSCBs -0.4***(-3.52) -0.03***(-3.65) -0.19***(-5.25) -0.05***(-6.18) 0.03(0.02) 
CCBs -0.34***(-3.24) -0.05***(-3.88) -0.23***(-4.88) -0.07***(-5.88) 0.22***(6.88) 
Observations 427 413 415 415 415 
Hansen test 0.403 0.400 0.488 0.952 0.802 
AR(1) 0.243 0.200 0.022 0.062 0.000 
AR(2) 0.104 0.266 0.121 0.674 0.900 
Notes: We use a two-step system GMM estimator. 
The symbols *, **, ***, represent significance levels of 10%, 5%. and 1%, respectively. The variables insolvency risk (total), technical efficiency (total), pure technical 
efficiency (total), and efficiency-adjusted Lerner index (total) are the estimated coefficients for the test that the sum of the lagged terms is equal to zero. A significance 
level lower than 10% enables us to reject the null hypothesis that x does not have an impact on y. A significant and positive sign indicates that the impact is positive, 
while a significant and negative sign indicates a negative impact. The null hypothesis of the Hansen test is that instruments used are not correlated with residuals and so 
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the overidentifying restrictions are valid. In AR (Arellano-Bond) tests for serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, the null hypothesis is that errors in the first 
difference regression do not exhibit first/second order serial correlation.         
